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THE PROFESSORS WHO CONTROL THE OIL 







Chase J. Edwards* 
Justin C. Ward** 
 
 
     Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently made headlinesi in legal news publications 
because of commentsii he made regarding the role of the legal 
academy in the nation’s court system.  In typical Posner style, 
he pulled no punches: “I don’t doubt that law professors are 
frequently active outside the classroom and that their academic 
work sometimes addresses practical issues, but what I’d like to 
see is evidence of impact.  Amicus briefs?  Working for 
nonprofits?  Blogging?  ‘Speaking truth to power?’  Absurd: 
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      Nevertheless, Louisiana courts have recently used treatises 
from ancient scholars Jean Domat (1625-1696) and Marcel 
Planiol (1853-1931) alongside commentary from contemporary 
civil law scholars such as A. N. Yiannopoulos and Alain 
Levasseur to decide the cases of Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc v. 
Amerada Hess Corp in 2011 and its progeny Regions Bank v. 
Questar Exploration & Production Corp4 in 2016, likely the 
most important cases in recent history for the oil and gas 
industry of Louisiana. 
   
     Despite a century of jurisprudential and scholarly analysis 
of the rights and obligations that exist between landowners and 
oil producers, no case law addressed the possibility that the 
language of certain mineral “leases” could actually transfer 
partial ownership of the land.  The arguments for and against 
the proposition were each cogent, valid, and feasible.  “Oil and 
gas production in Louisiana commenced on a significant scale 
just over a century ago.  Most mineral leases expire as 
production ends before they reach the 99-year mark.  [These] 
leases may be the first time that this issue has arisen.”5  The 
court was forced to go back to the basics, and lean on the 
treatises that all Louisiana lawyers cut their teeth on and the 
principles of textual interpretation that they established. 
 
     Often considered the platypus of jurisprudence, Louisiana 
operates a “bijural” legal system that has evolved to 
incorporate many characteristics of the common law while 
maintaining its civil law roots.  However, the lessons of these 
cases apply equally to all states that recognize “secondary 
sources” of law.  
 
     Section One of this paper recounts the first major battle over 
mineral rights in Louisiana which sought to dispose of leases 
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by asserting that reconduction of a lease based on continued 
production violated the requirement for leases to have a term. 
  
     Section Two delves into the intervening years of scholarship 
that addressed the general requirements and prohibitions of the 
Louisiana Mineral Code.  It explores their basis in public 
policy, and the subtle differences between mineral leases and 
mineral servitudes in light of the ancient dismemberments of 
ownership that are inherent in most civil law systems.  More 
importantly, it exemplifies the role of the professorate in 
developing official Comments to the various codes which are 
used by judges to interpret the meaning of the law as it is 
written by the legislature.  
 
     Section Three analyzes the doctrine of real and personal 
rights as expressed in several leading treatises from active and 
emeritus professors which build on the works of ancient 
commenters and scholars. These scholarly contributions form 
the basis of the rulings in both Eagle Pipe v. Amerada Hess 
and Regions v. Questar, which represent the first 
jurisprudential acknowledgments of the doctrinal tenants that 
have governed Louisiana’s billions of barrels of oil and 
trillions of cubic feet of natural gas for more than a century, 
and which set critical precedent for the next wave of mineral 
lease litigation that will attempt to invalidate leases based on 
the seemingly impenetrable prohibition against leases over 99 
years.  
 
     The conclusion of this paper recounts the contributions of 
treatise writers, professors, and practicing academics who help 
shape the legal landscape, and presents opportunities for 
professors to prove Judge Posner wrong by affecting change in 
the law through their work.   
 
 




LEASES HAVE LIMITS 
     The first successful oil well in Louisiana was drilled in 
September of 1901 outside the town of Jennings.  This 
discovery occurred just months after the famous “Spindletop” 
gushers were drilled less than 100 miles away in Beaumont, 
Texas.  The oil boom that followed has produced more than 25 
billion barrels of oil and 200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
from more than 1 million wells.  The impact of the mineral 
industry on Louisiana’s economy cannot be overstated. Thus, 
there is no shortage of litigation regarding ownership of the 
minerals themselves.  
 
     The first wave of litigation came ten years into the boom.  
Landowners who signed the first mineral leases sought to be 
released from their agreements in order to re-sign under the 
more favorable terms that became common as the industry 
became less speculative.  To do this, landowners attacked the 
various terms6 included in the leases. 
IDENTIFYING PERPETUAL LEASES 
     Louisiana law has always required that a lease have a term.  
It may not be perpetual or perpetually extendable.7 This 
principal, now embodied in Civil Code Article 2678, is derived 
from Article 2674 of the Civil Code of 1870 – which required a 
lease be for a “certain time” – and from a long line of 
Louisiana case law which held that a perpetual “lease” is 
nadum pactum.  This line of jurisprudence8 maintained that any 
stipulation which allowed a grantee to hold a grantors property 
under a perpetual lease or option would “take the property out 
of commerce and be violative of the doctrine of ownership.”9 
This principle was ultimately codified in both the Louisiana 
Civil Code and the Mineral Code.10 This ended the need for 
jurisprudential analysis of this requirement, but a study of its 
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reasoning is essential back story for the modern day fight over 
long-term leases wherein property owners seek to regain 
control of ancestral land that has been mined for close to a 
century.  
 
     Bristo v. Christine Oil & Gas Company is one of the earliest 
Louisiana decisions addressing a “perpetual lease.”11 At issue 
in Bristo was a contract purporting to be a sale of the minerals 
on or in the plaintiff’s property and a lease of the land for 
mining purposes.12 The contract stipulated that, if a well could 
not be commenced within a year from the date of the contract 
and “prosecuted with due diligence, the grant was to become 
null and void, provided that the grantee might prevent the 
forfeiture from year to year by paying to the grantor the sum of 
10 cents per acre annually until a well was commenced or until 
shipments from the mines had begun.”13 In considering the 
validity of the contract, the Court held: 
It may be assumed that the grantee could have 
acquired a mineral lease for 25 years by drilling 
a well on the plaintiff's land within the year 
stipulated in the contract.  It is not disputed that 
the grantee's rights, if he had any, under the 
contract, were forfeited by his failure to 
commence drilling a well on the plaintiff's land 
within the year, unless it be held that the 
defendant could prevent the forfeiture and keep 
the option in force indefinitely by paying the 
stipulated annual rental of 10 cents an 
acre…Our opinion is that that stipulation in the 
contract is null for want of a fixed or definite 
term.  Whether it be regarded as a lease or an 
option, it would be an anomalous contract 
without a definite term or limitation.  To 
recognize that the defendant has the right, 
without any obligation, to hold the plaintiffs 




land under a perpetual lease or option, would 
take the property out of commerce, and would 
be violative of the doctrine of ownership 
defined in the second title of the second book of 
the Civil Code.14 
 
     The holding of Bristo was recited a number of times in 
cases immediately following its rendition.15 Hence, judges 
have adopted the following definitions as indicative of the 
nature of a perpetual lease.  As to a mineral lease, “[t]he lease 
in perpetuity reprobated by the law is the mere holding by the 
lessee, indefinitely, of an option to exploit the property, 
without production of any kind, since the lessee must either 
develop with reasonable diligence or give up the lease.”16  As 
to a surface lease, a perpetual lease should be considered as an 
instrument that would allow the lessee the option of retaining 
his interest in the property indefinitely without the lessor 
having the right to terminate the contract by operation of a 
term.17 
 
HABENDUM CLAUSES BECOME STANDARD ACROSS THE OIL & GAS 
INDUSTRY 
 
     The purpose of the habendum clause in an oil and gas lease 
is to fix the ultimate duration of the interest granted to the 
lessee.18 A habendum clause essentially predicates the term of 
the lease based upon the occurrence of a resolutory condition19 
– i.e. the cessation of production in paying quantities.  While 
the Louisiana Mineral Code has long prohibited leases in 
perpetuity, leases which have stipulated to continue during the 
existence of a certain condition have been held to be valid.20 
This rule has been applied to both surface leases and mineral 
leases.21 
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     Both Poole v. Winwell, Inc. and Cain v. GoldKing 
Properties Company involved surface leases with terms tied to 
the continued production of oil and gas on property not 
included within the leased area.22 In Poole, the Louisiana Third 
Circuit Court of Appeal, which covers the oil-rich southwest 
portion of the state, turned to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
decision in Busch-Everett Co. v. Vivian Oil Co.23 (wherein the 
Court upheld a mineral lease under a habendum clause) and 
concluded that “our Supreme Court has upheld a lease with a 
production term similar to those in the instant case, holding 
that it is not necessary that the term of a lease be expressed in 
terms of time, for the lease may be stipulated to continue only 
during the continuation of a given condition.  Accordingly, the 
term provisions of the leases involved in the instant suit are not 
at variance with codal requirements.” Cain was decided soon 
thereafter in another oil-producing area of the state.24  
 
     The same concept has long applied specifically to mineral 
leases.  In Busch-Everett, the Supreme Court considered the 
validity of a mineral lease which provided that, should the 
lessee succeed in “bringing in a second well in paying 
quantities, then the contract was to continue in full force for 
two years, and as much longer as oil, gas, or other minerals 
can be produced in paying quantities.”25 (emphasis added) In 
upholding the lease agreement, the court stated: 
Now as relates to a term: 
It was really more of a condition than a term.  
The contract was to continue in force as long as 
the wells produced.  That was a condition, 
which, it may be, plaintiffs could have 
terminated by obtaining a judicial order to that 
effect.  But a contract of lease (and in this 
respect we consider the contract one of lease) 
may be entirely legal without a term, or a term 




may be so indefinite that only the court can 
determine its date.26 
 
     The Court expressed a similar opinion in Sam George Fur 
Company v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipeline Company.27 At issue 
therein was a mineral lease with the following provision: 
If the Lessee shall sink a well or shaft and 
discover oil, gas or sulphur in paying quantities 
in or under the above described land, then this 
lease shall remain in full force and effect for ten 
years from such discovery and as much longer 
as oil, gas or sulphur shall be produced 
therefrom in paying quantities. 
The Plaintiff challenged the validity of the lease and sought to 
have the contract canceled on the grounds that the above 
quoted language essentially established a perpetual lease, and 
was thus null and void.28 The Court responded to this argument 
by stating: “[s]uch a lease is by no means a lease in perpetuity, 
as the main consideration of the lease is the development of the 
land, and it is a matter of common knowledge that oil and gas 
fields cease to produce in paying quantities after the lapse of a 
certain number of years.  The lease in perpetuity reprobated by 
the law is the mere holding by the lessee, indefinitely, of an 
option to exploit the property, without production of any 
kind…”29 
 
So, in the first great battle of remorseful landowners versus 
oil producers, landowners clearly lost.  Courts ruled so 
consistently, during the first decades of oil litigation, that 
mineral production extended the lifetime of a lease that the 
Mineral Code was amended to say just that.  And, for the rest 
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BUT, SOMETIMES, A LEASE ISN’T A LEASE 
 
     The Louisiana Civil Code’s first article states that “[t]he 
sources of law are legislation and custom.”30  Custom, in turn, 
“results from practice repeated for a long time and generally 
accepted as having acquired the force of law.”31 Custom is 
most often developed and cited in the writings of professors 
who document the year-to-year happenings of business and 
legal dealings in their scholarly journal articles and treatises. 
 
     The concept of prescription32, which is analogous to a 
“statute of limitations” in other states, is naturally well-litigated 
due its dispositive nature in litigation.  Provisions in the 
various codes (Civil, Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, etc.) 
govern the lifetime of a right’s existence and the actions that 
can extend or exterminate that right.  The Louisiana Mineral 
Code supplements the state’s Civil Code and covers issues 
regarding mineral law, including mineral leases.33  
 
     Article 115 of the Louisiana Mineral Code imposes certain 
term limitations on the typical mineral lease.  The provision 
provides in relevant part: 
The interest of a mineral lessee is not subject to 
the prescription of nonuse, but the lease must 
have a term.  Except as provided in this Article, 
a lease shall not be continued for a period of 
more than ten years without drilling or mining 
operations or production.  Except as provided in 
this Article, if a mineral lease permits 
continuance for a period greater than ten years 
without drilling or mining operations or 
production, the period is reduced to ten years.34 
 
PROFESSORS AS OFFICIAL COMMENTERS 
 




     Each Code within Louisiana Law has Comments, the text of 
which are not law, but are persuasive authority when judicial 
interpretation of the law is needed.  The Comments do not 
come from the lawmakers who write the legislation. Instead, 
they come from the Louisiana State Law Institute which is 
comprised of law professors, jurists, and practicing 
academics35 who meet regularly to provide commentary on 
existing and pending legislation.  In other words, the work of 
professors is printed alongside the words of legislators. In the 
recent cases discussed herein, the official Comments played an 
important role. 
 
     The Comments to Article 115 explain that the article 
generally preserves established law and custom by providing 
that the interest of the lessee is not subject to prescription; that 
a lease must contain a term; and that the standard habendum36 
clause will generally satisfy the term requirement.  However, 
the Comments go further in explaining that the requirement 
that a mineral lease not contain a primary term of more than 10 
years is somehow related to the prescription of nonuse 
applicable to mineral servitudes, which are real rights.  The 
Comments provide: 
[T]here has always lurked in the background of 
the law applicable to mineral leases the 
possibility that the court might hold that 
although a mineral lease is not subject to the 
prescription of nonuse, it cannot be granted for a 
primary term greater than ten years.  
Customarily, primary terms do not exceed ten 
years… Placing this limitation on the primary 
term is consistent with the public policy 
underlying the system of prescription applicable 
to other mineral rights.  The net effect of this 
limitation in combination with the first sentence 
[of Article 115] is to free the mineral lease of 
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the use rules applicable to servitudes while 
accomplishing the end of prohibiting all basic 
forms of mineral rights from remaining 
outstanding for periods greater than ten years 
without some form of development…  
Previously, it was not established that the 
mineral lease either could or could not be 
granted for a primary term greater than ten 
years.  The danger of providing expressly that 
they could be granted for primary terms greater 
than ten years lay in the possibility that there 
might be widespread evasion of the public 
policy embodied in the prescriptive rules 
applicable to other forms of mineral rights.  In 
selling land, the vendor might reserve a paid-up 
mineral lease with a primary term of thirty years 
rather than a mineral servitude.  Previously, the 
threat that the court might impose the sort of 
limitation provided for by Article 115 had a 
deterrent effect on the widespread granting of 
long term leases.  The removal of that threat 
might have resulted in subversion of the entire 
system of prescription.  It is therefore provided 
that the ten-year limitation be imposed.  This is 
viewed as essential to preservation of the 
mineral property system as a whole. 
 
SCHOLARS DEVELOP THE MINERAL SERVITUDE DOCTRINE INTO A 
REAL RIGHT FOR LEASEHOLDERS  
 
     The Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Mineral 
Servitude Doctrine in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s 
Heirs in 1922.37 This doctrine precludes the creation of a 
mineral estate distinct from, and independent of, the full title to 
the land, and is perhaps the most unusual feature of Louisiana 




mineral law when compared to the mineral regimes of other 
states.38 A mineral servitude conveys the right of enjoyment of 
land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and 
producing minerals and reducing them to ownership.39 The 
Supreme Court has described the conveyance of a servitude as 
a “dismemberment of the title insofar as it creates a secondary 
right in the property separate from the principal right of 
ownership of the land…[and]…effectively fragments the title 
such that different elements of ownership are owned by 
different owners.” 40 
 
     The works of professor-written treatises are essential to 
developing an understanding of this subtle, but critical, 
distinction.  “While the jargon of the industry often speaks in 
reference to the ‘term’ of a mineral servitude or to a mineral 
servitude having a ‘life’ of ten years, in actuality, a servitude is 
a real right of unlimited duration, provided that it does not 
extinguish in some manner recognized by law.”41 The Mineral 
Code provides for various modes of extinction of a mineral 
servitude; however, the most significant cause for extinction is 
“prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years.”42 
Prescription begins to accrue from the date on which the 
servitude is created, and if the servitude is to be maintained 
beyond ten years, some use of the right must be made.43 
However, there is no limitation on the successive 10-year 
periods which can be triggered by successive use.44 
 
     The scholarship clearly indicates that, other than the 10-year 
prescription of non-use, there is no legally imposed temporal 
limit on the existence of a mineral servitude yet no cases have 
ever been cited for this proposition, only the work of 
scholars.45  
 
     Leaseholders also found support in the Comments on 
Mineral Code Article 74, again written by the scholars and 
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professors of the Louisiana State Law Institute, which provide 
that parties may either fix the term of a mineral servitude or 
shorten the applicable period of prescription of nonuse or 
both.46 If a period of prescription greater than ten years is 
stipulated, the period is reduced to ten years.47 The Comments 
to Article 74 explain: 
In the event of silence as to the term of a 
mineral servitude, the right created is 
permanent or perpetual, but it is subject to loss 
by accrual of prescription of nonuse.   
It is established by Hodges v. Norton and 
Bodcaw Lumber Company of Louisiana v. 
Magnolia Petroleum Company, that if a term 
greater than ten years is specified, this fixes the 
duration of the interest created.  It is however, 
still subject to the prescription of nonuse and 
will expire prior to the running of the specified 
term if not used within the legal prescriptive 
period.48 
 
     The principals espoused in Article 74 and the comments 
thereto were, to an extent, addressed in Hodges v. Norton and 
Bodcaw Lumber Company of Louisiana v. Magnolia Petroleum 
Company. In Hodges v. Norton the Court dealt with a mineral 
reservation “for a period of 15-years from and after” the date of 
its granting.49 The Court noted that the servitude was “limited 
in its duration to fifteen years and that, even though the course 
of prescription was interrupted” the servitude would prescribe 
at the expiration of the fifteen year term.50 In Bodcaw Lumber 
Co. of Louisiana v. Magnolia Petroleum Company.51 The 
Court considered a mineral servitude “for the term of fifteen 
years.”52 The Court explained:  
The time limit of fifteen years, within which 
Bodcaw Lumber Company, or its successors or 
assigns, might have extracted or removed the oil 




and gas from the land, was inserted in the 
contract, not for the purpose of extending the 
time within which the right might be enjoyed, 
but for the purpose of limiting the time in which 
it might be enjoyed. 
 
     Neither Hodges (1942) nor Bodcaw (1929) contain an 
affirmation that a mineral servitude, without some contractual 
limitation, is a perpetual interest subject to the incidents of 
extinction set forth in the Mineral Code.  In both cases, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court was addressing conflict over leases 
in an industry that was still in its infancy.  However, 
commenters and treatise writers adopted these cases as 
exemplary of how the law should treat these agreements.  
Seventy years after Hodges, when the courts had to decide 
whether or not leases which extended beyond 99 years were 
valid, it was the inclusion of these cases in scholarly writings 
which gave them the force of law.   
 
DESPITE BEING CALLED A “LEASE”, SCHOLARSHIP 
DICTATES THAT A MINERAL LEASE IS A REAL 
(PROPERTY) RIGHT 
 
     According to the rigorous civilian classification system, all 
rights are either personal or real.53 Real rights are referenced 
throughout the Code, and, while no legislative definition exists, 
this type of interest is generally described as ownership and its 
various forms of dismemberment based on the writings of 
ancient and modern professors and scholars. In the most basic 
terms, a real right is a right that a person has in a thing – i.e. a 
matter of property law – while a personal right is a right that a 
person has against another person to demand a performance – 
i.e. a matter of the law of obligations.54 As explained by 
Professor Yiannopoulos:  
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[D]espite certain similarities, the two species of 
rights appear to be of a different nature.  
According to appearances, a usufructuary55 and 
a lessee seem to have the use and enjoyment of 
a house in much the same way.  But, 
technically, the usufructuary has a right in the 
enjoyment of a house; the lessee has a right 
against the owner of a house to let him enjoy it.  
One has a real right and the other a personal 
right.56 
 
     The Mineral Code and its Comments now identify mineral 
leases as a real right.57 And while this classification may have 
been questioned by early Louisiana Supreme Court decisions,58 
the classification of a mineral lease as a real right has become a 
fixture in Louisiana law.59 In contrast, it is well settled in 
Louisiana that under the “civil law concept, a lease does not 
convey any real right or title to the property leased, but only a 
personal right.”60 This is a material distinction between mineral 
leases and surface leases. 
 
     The classification of an interest as a “real” or “personal” 
right is fundamental in civil law systems.61 Real rights are 
property rights that confer direct and immediate authority over 
a “thing” to be enforced against the world.62 Without a “thing” 
to which the real right may attach, a real right cannot exist.  A 
personal right does not attach to any particular “thing,” it is 
merely the right of a particular obligee to enforce a particular 
obligation against a particular obligor.  All real rights, 
including mineral leases, have certain common characteristics 
that are not exhibited by personal rights absent some special 
provision to the contrary.  These characteristics may be 
summarized as follows: 




1. Real rights always attach to a thing.  
Personal rights however do not require a 
specific thing to exist.63 
2. Real rights may be enforced against the 
world.  Personal rights may only be enforced 
by the obligee against the obligor who 
legally or conventionally assumed the 
obligation sought to be enforced.64 
3. Real rights follow the thing to which they 
are attached, thus anyone who takes 
ownership of a thing encumbered by a real 
right takes it subject to that right.  Personal 
rights remain with the obligor, they do not 
follow the thing because they do not attach 
to the thing.65 
4. Real rights may be created unilaterally by 
the holder.  Personal rights necessarily 
require a certain obligee and a certain 
obligor.66 
5. Real rights can be abandoned unilaterally by 
the holder.  Personal rights because they 
involve both a certain obligor and a certain 
obligee, cannot be abandoned by the obligor 
without the consent of an obligee.67 
6. The obligations correlative to real rights can 
be avoided by dispossession of the thing to 
which they are attached.  Personal rights are 
not necessarily affected by the transfer of a 
particular thing.68 
 
     The division of patrimonial rights into personal and real is 
inherit in the structure of the Louisiana Civil Code.69  A 
personal right is the legal power that a person, the obligee, has 
to demand from another person, the obligor, a performance 
consisting of giving, doing, or not doing.70 As explained by the 
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Louisiana Supreme Court, a personal right “defines man’s 
relationship to man and refers merely to an obligation one owes 
to another which may be declared against the obligor.”71 
Personal rights are governed by the law of obligations found in 
Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code, entitled “Of the Different 
Modes of Acquiring the Ownership of Things.72   
 
     Personal rights must be contrasted with real rights.  A real 
right should be understood as ownership and its various forms 
of dismemberment.73 As explained by the Court, “a real right is 
synonymous with proprietary interest, both of which refer to a 
species of ownership.  Ownership defines the relationship of 
man to things and may, therefore, be declared against the 
world.”74 The various dismemberments of ownership allowed 
under Louisiana law each confer real rights on the owner or 
holder of that interest.75  
 
     Planiol spoke at length on the primary distinction between 
real rights and personal rights, which he refers to as “right of 
credit.”76 He explained the importance of the characteristics 
inherent in real rights by reference to the following examples: 
There are considerable practical differences 
between [real rights and rights of credit].  Two 
examples will bring out the nature of the 
differences. 
(1)  INSOLVENCY OF A TRADER.  All the 
creditors of an insolvent trader are in the same 
position.  Each of them has his claim to assert 
against the insolvent, but none of them has special 
rights to advance against the others.  They are all 
therefore upon a plane of equality.  No one of them 
can prevail over the others.  And if we assume, as is 
the ordinary case, that they are all of them creditors 
for sums of money, the loss resulting from the 
insolvency of the common debtor must be divided 




among them.  Each of them will receive merely a 
dividend, so much per cent upon the sum due.  This 
result is expressed by saying that the creditors are 
governed by the law applicable in competitive 
proceedings, and they are paid, in case of 
insolvency, pro rata. 
 But another person appears who has a real right.  
An owner for example, claims as his property 
merchandise deposited in the insolvent’s store; or a 
second creditor asserts in addition to his claim, a 
special real right called a pledge or mortgage.  
These persons have a real right that can be set off 
against all persons, including the insolvent’s 
creditors.  They will, therefore, be able to exclude 
all these creditors, and keep for themselves either in 
kind or in value the things that belong to them or 
which had been pledged to or mortgaged to them.  
The competitive rule therefore does not apply.  
They have, as regards the others, a right of 
preference. 
(2)  THEFT OF A MOVABLE.  When a thing has 
been stolen, he who is its owner may lay claim to it, 
that is to say, follow the thief or any other detainer 
of the thing to reclaim his property.  He who is 
merely a creditor has solely an action in restitution 
or in indemnification against the person who owed 
it to him or who permitted it to be stolen.  He has no 
real action that can be set off against everybody.  
He has a more personal action against the debtor, 
who alone is responsible to him.  The difference is 
expressed by saying that the real right confers a 
right of pursuit which a right of credit does not.  
The owner follows, pursues the thing into whatever 
hands it passes.  A creditor cannot follow the thing.  
He can attack nobody other than his debtor. 
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 Right of Pursuit and Right of Preference: these 
are the great advantages of real rights over rights of 
credit.  These are not, as is often said, special 
attributes, something extrinsic, attached to real 
rights.  They are the very essence of its realness, 
that is to say the nature opposable to all persons.77 
 
CONCLUSION AND PREDICTIONS FOR UPCOMING 
LITIGATION  
 
LAWSUITS 99 YEARS IN THE MAKING 
 
     Landowners will continually seek ways to end longstanding 
mineral leases and servitudes.  The latest and greatest hope to 
wipe the slate clean and regain control of their oil, gas, and 
minerals is the Louisiana Civil Code’s prohibition of leases 
over 99 years.  At stake are thousands of oil and gas leases 
blanketing a state that has produced over 25,000,000,000 
barrels of oil and 200,000,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural 
gas.  Despite the gravity of the situation, the law is silent on 
whether or not mineral leases are limited by the 99-year 
prohibition.   
  
     However, courts have begun to adopt the writings of legal 
scholars who assert that these mineral leases, under certain 
circumstances, may not be leases at all, but, in fact, create an 
ownership interest in favor of the leaseholder in the form of a 
mineral servitude.  Thus, to apply Louisiana Civil Code Article 
2679’s conventional 99-year lease limit to a mineral lease 
would be to completely disregard the structure of the code and 
the inherit distinction between real rights and personal rights.  
 
     The scholarly commentary clearly indicates that a mineral 
lease is a real right, and it exhibits the major characteristics of 
such: the mineral lease may follow the land, regardless of 




transfers of ownership; the mineral lessee may assert his rights 
against the world just as the proprietor of any real right; the 
lessee may enjoy directly and draw from the land a part of its 
economic advantages by appropriating a wasting asset; the 
lessee has certain rights of preference; and the lessee holds a 
right that is, in reality, susceptible of a type of possession 
through exercise.78  
 
     The first major adoption of this concept was Eagle Pipe and 
Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., a towering 40-page 
recitation of civil law tradition written by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court which contains 24 citations to treatises, one 
law review citation, and 22 citations to the Comments of the 
Law Institute.79  
 
LAW TEACHERS STILL SERVE AS LAW MAKERS 
 
      “[Legal scholars] share a language of discourse with 
important decision makers in the real world, such as judges and 
legislators.  Standard legal scholarship often self-consciously 
seeks to prescribe real world solutions to real problems.”80  
 
     Contrary to the words of Judge Posner, law professors have 
an exciting and influential role to play in the development of 
jurisprudence.  Technological advances in the 21st century 
move far too quickly to await the opinions of an appellate 
court.  In the short term, the work of scholars in trade journals, 
law reviews, treatises, symposia, and in the media has a direct 
impact on the business world and helps shape the future of 
commerce.  Over the long arc of time, some bodies of legal 
scholarship gain the force of law, as happened in the cases 
above, but every legal scholar has an opportunity to publish 
work that will inform, educate, and persuade the legislatures 
and jurist across the nation.  
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